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Smith: Constitutional Law - Forced Advertising: Free Speech or Not Even

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Forced Advertising: Free Speech or Not
Even? Glickman v. Wieman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).

INTRODUCTION

The "California Dancing Raisins" sing "I Heard it Through the Grapevine.", Celebrities with milk mustaches appear in ads captioned "Got
Milk?"' Beef is touted as "Real food for Real People,"' and "It's [also]
What's for Dinner." 4 These familiar advertisements are the product of some
of the thirty-four marketing campaigns authorized by the United States Department of Agriculture.' The programs collect about 750 million dollars
each year' to be used for promotional purposes, such as the generic advertising examples above., Among the commodities for which the Department
of Agriculture has authorized generic advertising are California nectarines,
plums, and peachess In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. and Elliott, Inc., the
Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to regulations that
required handlers and processors of these fruits to fund this generic advertising.'
Wileman Bros. and Elliott, Inc. (Wileman) is a large handler of California fruits."° In 1988, Wileman filed a petition with the Secretary of Agriculture challenging the generic advertising regulations." The generic advertising regulations are part of a series of regulations, known as marketing
orders, that govern a number of agricultural markets. 1 Wilemans challenge
included a claim that these regulations compelled it to finance speech in
violation of the First Amendment." In conjunction with this claim, Wileman
refused to pay the assessments required by the regulations."4 The Adminis-

1. David Savage & Nancy Rivera Brooks, Supreme CourtSays FarmersMust Keep PayingforAds
Agriculture: Genericpromotions are characterizedas type of 'economic regulation' that iaroutinely
upheld, L.A. TIMEs, June 26, 1997, at DI.
2. Brian Williams, Farmers Question Checkoff Program to Pay for Commodities Advertising,
COLUMBus DISPATCH, Nov. 29, 1996, at FI.
3. Savage, supra note 1,at Dl.
4. Steve Lash, Justices Hear First Amendment Challenge to Government Require4 Industywide
AgricultureAds, WEST'S LEGALNEWS, Dec. 3, 1996, at 12898, available in 1996 WL 687547.
S. Id.
6. Id.
7. Generic advertising is defined as the promotion of a particular commodity, without reference to a
particular brand or producer. 7 C.F.R. § 1485.11 (g), (s)(1997). See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
9. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130,2135 (1997).
10. Id. Wileman also packs and markets its output, as well as that of other growers. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.at 2134.
13. Id. at 2135.
14. Id.
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trative Law Judge (AL) ruled for Wileman, without resolving the First
Amendment question." The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture reversed the ALJ's decision.", Wileman, along with fifteen other handlers, appealed the decision to the district court." The district court upheld
the challenged regulations and entered judgment of 3.1 million dollars in
past due assessments against the handlers." The handlers appealed the district court's decision, claiming that the generic advertising provisions of the
regulations violated both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the
First Amendment., The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the handler's APA challenge. 0 However, the court determined that such government-enforced contributions to pay for generic advertising violated the First
Amendment rights of the handlers." It based its ruling on prior Supreme
Court cases addressing the First Amendment implications of compelled
speech and commercial speech.22
The Ninth Circuit's disposition of the handler's First Amendment
claim conflicted with the Third Circuit's rejection of a similar First
Amendment challenge to comparable regulations in the beef industryY The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits.2'
In reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Court held that the regulations
authorizing generic advertising need only survive the rational basis test applied to economic regulations, rather than the heightened scrutiny used to
review regulations implicating the First Amendment." The Court stated that
"none of our First Amendment jurisprudence provides any support for the
suggestion that the promotional regulations should be scrutinized under a
different standard than that applicable to the other anticompetitive features

15. Id. The ALJ said she would have ruled in Wileman's favor on his First Amendment claims. Id at
2135 n.6.
16. Id. at 2135.
17. Id. The appeal was pursuant to 7 U.SC. § 608c(15)(B) (1994).
18. Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at 2135.
19. Id. at 2136.
20. Id.See Wileman Bros. & Elliott v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that substantial
evidence justified both the original decision to engage in generic advertising and the decision to
continue the program).
21. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2136. See Wileman Bros. & Elliott v. Espy, 58 F.3d at 1367.
22. Glickman, 117 S. Ct at 2136. See Wileman Bros. & Elliott v. Espy, 58 F.3d at 1367 (relying on
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and the three-part test established in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), to say that the
forced contributions violated the First Amendment).
23. The conflict is with the Third Circuit's decision in UnitedStatesv. Frame, 885 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.
1989). Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at 2137. The court in Frame "rejected a challenge to generic advertising for
beef authorized by the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985." Id.
24. Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at2137.
25. Id. at 2142. The Court framed the issue by saying, "[t]he legal question that we address is
whether being compelled to fund this advertising raises a First Amendment issue for us to resolve, or
rather is simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the Executive to resolve." Id. at 2138.
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of the marketing orders."' The Court said the regulations on forced collective advertising are "a species of economic regulation that should enjoy the
same strong presumption of validity that we accord to other policy judgments made by Congress."" Thus, the Court held that the regulations did not
even implicate the First Amendment, let alone violate it.
This case note will discuss the history, merits, and implications of the
Court's decision. It first discusses the history and application of marketing
orders and the line of cases that the majority examined in upholding the
regulations. Second, it summarizes both the majority and dissenting opinions. Finally, the note discusses how the simplistic reasoning of the majority
has set dangerous precedent for future cases.
BACKGROUND
The AgriculturalMarketingAgreement Act of 193 7
In 1937, Congress enacted the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937 ("AMAA" or "the Act") in an effort to "establish and maintain
orderly marketing conditions and fair prices for agricultural commodities."2'
The AMAA gives the Secretary of Agriculture ("the Secretary") the authority to promulgate regulations to implement the Act." These regulations,
known as marketing orders, provide for uniform prices, determine the quality and quantity of the commodity that may be marketed, and provide for
the "orderly disposition of any surplus that might depress market prices."''
"Pursuant to the policy of collective, rather than competitive marketing, the
orders also authorize joint research and development projects, inspection
procedures that ensure uniform quality, and even certain standardized packaging requirements."'2 One activity that Congress has expressly authorized
is the establishment of projects "designed to assist, improve, or promote the
marketing, distribution, and consumption... [of the commodity, through]

26. Id.
27. Id at 2142. The Court further stated,
[Tlhe mere fact that one or more producers 'do not wish to foster' generic advertising of their
product is not a sufficient reason for overriding the judgment of the majority of market
participants, bureaucrats, and legislators who have concluded that such programs are
beneficial. Id.
28. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 137, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602, 608a-608e, 610, 612, 614,671-74 (1994)).
29. Glickman, 117 S. Ct at 2134 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 602(1) (1994)).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1). After giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing, the Secretary can issue
marketing orders that "tend to effectuate the declared policy" of the Act. Id §§ 608c(3)-(4). Marketing
orders must be approved by either two-thirds of the affected producers or by producers who market at
least two-thirds of the volume of the commodity. Id. § 608c(9)(B).
31. Glickman, 117 S. Ct at 2134.
32. Id.
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any form of marketing promotion including paid advertising."'
Committees, appointed by the Secretary, carry out the marketing orders.? The duties of the committees include recommending rules and regulations to the Secretary"5 as well as recommending the annual rate of assessments to be charged in order to cover the expenses of administering the
marketing orders.- Each handler must pay a share of these expenses based
on their pro rata.share of the commodity they handle 7 Marketing Order 916
and Marketing Order 917 are the specific regulations at issue in Glickman."
These orders expressly authorize, and thus require handlers to pay for, the
generic advertising of nectarines, peaches, and plums grown in California. 19
Regulations on Speech
A.

Commercial Speech and the First Amendment

In order to understand Glickman, it is important to understand several
different strands of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Court has defined commercial speech as "expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience" and as "speech proposing a commercial transaction."' The Court delineated the First Amendment protections for commercial speech in CentralHudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of N.Y 4' In that case, the Supreme
Court held that a ban by the New York Public Service Commission prohibiting advertising was unconstitutional because it violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." However, in striking down the regulation, the
Court did not apply the heightened scrutiny standard it often applies to restrictions on expression.4 3 Instead, the Court applied an "intermediate scrutiny" test, expressly holding that commercial speech merits lesser protection

33. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(1) (1994).
34. Glickman, 117 S. Ct at 2134 (citing 7 C.F.R. §§ 916.23, 916.62, 917.25, 917.30 (1997)). The
committees are composed of producers and handlers of the commodity. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(7)(c) (1994).
The Act defines handlers as "processors, associations of producers and others engaged in the handling of
... [the] commodity or product." Id. § 608c(I).
35. Nectarines Grown in California, 7 C.F.R. § 916.51-.52, Fresh Pears and Peaches Grown in California. Id §§ 917.40 to -.41 (1997).
36. 7 C.F.R. §§ 916.31(c), 917.35(0 (1997).
37. Id. §§ 916.41,917.37.
38. Id. §§ 916,917.
39. Glickmnm, 117 S. Ct. at 2134 & nn.4-5. Plums, while not currently under a marketing order, were
still relevant to this case because Wileman was seeking a refund of assessments charged during the time
period when a marketing order still covered plums. Id.
40. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561-62
(1980).
41. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
42. Id at 570.
43. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
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than does other constitutionally guaranteed expression.- The Court developed a three-part test for regulations concerning lawful, non-misleading
commercial speech. 5 First, the government interest in regulating the speech
must be substantial." Second, the regulation must directly advance the asserted government interest." Third, the regulation must not be more extensive than necessary to serve that interest."
B.

Compelled Speech and the First Amendment

The government's ability to compel speech is limited in the same way
and by the same concerns as its ability to limit speech." For example, in
Wooley v. Maynard," the Court considered "whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in an ideological message by
displaying it on his private property.""' Reviewing the law under heightened
scrutiny, the Court held that the State may not prohibit an individual from
covering up the motto "Live Free or Die" on his license plate. The Court
said the First Amendment protects "both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all."51 The Court found that of the two State
interests, the promotion of history and state pride was not compelling
enough to outweigh the individual's right to avoid being the courier of the
State's message, and that the regulation was not narrowly tailored in facilitating the identification of passenger vehicles."
C.

Compelled Contributions to Fund the Speech of Others

In a series of cases similar to those involving compelled speech, the
Court has found that compelling individuals to fund speech also raises First
Amendment concerns. In the case of Abood v. DetroitBoard of Education,"
the issue was whether an "agency shop" agreement violates the constitutional rights of employees.

44. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 563, 566.
45. Id at 566.
46. Id.
47. Id
48. Id. In Central Hudson, the Court found that the regulations directly advanced the Commission's
substantial interest in energy conservation, but that the complete suppression of the advertising was more
extensive than necessary. Id. at 568-71.
49. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text See also infra note 66 for cases establishing the
freedom from being compelled to speak.
50. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
51. Id. at713.
52. Id. at 715.
53. Id. at 714.
54. Id. at 716-17.
55. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
56. Id at 211. An agency shop agreement is an arrangement between a union and a local government
where all employees, as a condition of employment, must pay to the union a service fee equal to the
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In Abood, the Court held that there was no First Amendment violation
where fees collected under an agency shop agreement were used to fund
union activities such as collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment." However, the Court held that employees could not
be compelled to fund ideological activities (as opposed to the activities
listed above) that the employees opposed" because "[tihe fact that [employees] are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their constitutional rights.""9
Issues concerning commercial speech, compelled speech, and compelled funding of other's speech all came together in the case of Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. and Elliott, Inc. In Glickman, the Court was to decide
whether the First Amendment afforded protection to members of a group
where government regulations required that all members pay for generic
advertisements.
PRINCIPAL CASE

The Majority
In Glickman, the Court held that the marketing orders for peaches,
plums, and nectarines requiring handlers to fund generic advertising were
not "law[s] 'abridging the freedom of speech' within the meaning of the
First Amendment." The Court determined that the regulations at issue were
similar to other requirements contained in the marketing orders and thus did
not even implicate the First Amendment." Upon holding that the First
Amendment did not apply to the regulations, the Court applied a rational
basis test, rather than heightened scrutiny, to determine whether the regulations were lawful.
The Court reached its conclusion by first recognizing the importance of
the context in which this case arose:
California nectarines and peaches are marketed pursuant to detailed
marketing orders that have displaced many aspects of independent
business activity that characterize other portions of the economy in
which competition is fully protected by the antitrust laws. The business entities that are compelled to fimd the generic advertising at
amount of union dues, even if they are not a part of the union. Id.
57. l at 225-26.
58. Id. at 235.
59. Id. at 234.
60. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130,2134,2138 (1997).
61. Id. at 2138. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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issue in this litigation do so as part of a broader collective enterprise in which their feedom to act independently is already constrainedby the regulatoryscheme. It is in this context that we consider whether we should review the assessments used to fund col11
lective advertising ....
The Court then held that three characteristics of the regulations distinguished them from laws that implicated the First Amendment.
A.

Claim One--Restriction on Speech

First, the Court distinguished the line of cases represented by Central
Hudson by noting that the marketing orders did not restrict producers from
communicating any message, commercial or otherwise, to any audience."
The Court rejected Wileman's claim that the regulations violated the First
Amendment because the payments reduce the amount of money that the
handlers can spend on their own advertising, thus preventing speech as in
Central Hudson. The Court reasoned that other assessments warranted under the marketing orders" also reduce the amount available for advertising,
but that the "First Amendment has never been construed to require heightened scrutiny of any financial burden that has the incidental effect of constraining the size of a firm's advertising budget."''
B.

Claim Two--Compelled Speech

Second, the Court distinguished Glickman from the line of cases where
the State compelled people to engage in actual or symbolic speech." It
pointed out that the assessments used to pay for the advertising did not require respondents to "repeat an objectionable message out of their own
mouths,"'' "use their own property to convey an antagonistic ideological
message,"" "respond to a hostile message when they 'would prefer to remain silent',"" or "be publicly identified or associated with another's mes-

62. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2138 (emphasis added).
63. Id. The Court also cited Virginia State 8d.of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). Glickman, 117
S. Ct. at 2138 n.12.
64. The Court listed activities such as employee benefits and inspection fees. Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at
2138.
65. Id. at2139.
66. Id. at 2138 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Wooley v.
Maryland, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Riley v. National Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); and
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1985)). See
Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at 2138 n.13.
67. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2139.
68. Id. See supranotes 50-54 and accompanying text.
69. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2139. The Court cited Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utililities
Comm 'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 18 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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sage." 10 The Court said that the marketing orders merely required respondents to fund generic advertising, not speak themselves, and moreover, the
advertising did not convey any message with which the respondents disagreed."
C. Claim Three--Government Compelled Contributions to Fund
Speech
Finally, the Court held that the regulations did not oblige the producers
to endorse or finance any political or ideological views. 7 While the Court
acknowledged that the First Amendment forbids, at least without sufficient
justification, government-compelled contributions to fund the speech of
others," it concluded that Abood did not say that the First Amendment always protects an individual from being forced to pay into an organization
that engages in expressive activities." The Court limited the holding in
Abood as "merely recogniz[ing] a First Amendment interest in not being
compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief.", The Court said the compelled contributions for political purposes unrelated to collective bargaining in Abood
violated the First Amendment because "they interfere[d] with the values
lying at the 'heart of the First Amendment the notion that an individual
should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs
should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State."' In Glickman, on the other hand, the Court distinguished making
the handlers pay for advertising that promoted California tree fruit from
cases where messages conveyed a political or ideological belief. The Court
said the generic advertising programs did not implicate the First Amendment simply because some handlers may have thought that too much or too
little was being spent on advertising, or that independent advertising would
have worked better."
After concluding that nothing in the regulations even implicated the
First Amendment, the Court went on to say its "cases provide affirmative
support for the proposition that assessments to fund a lawful collective pro-

70. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2139. The Court cited Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S.
74 (1980) as supportive of this conclusion.
71. GIckman, 117 S. Ct. at2139.
72. Id. at 2138 (citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); and Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). Glickman,
117 S. Ct. at213S n.14.
73. Gliclnan, 117 S.Ct at 2139.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,235 (1976)).
76. Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at 2139 (second alteration in original) (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209,234-35 (1976)).
77. Gltckman, 117 S.Ct.at2140.
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gram may sometimes be used to pay for speech over the objection of some
members of the group."' The Court relied on the rule from Keller v. State
Bar of California.' According to the Court, an organization may "constitutionally fund activities germane to [its] goals out of the mandatory dues of
all members, [but] [i]t may not, however, in such a manner fund activities of
an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity."" The

Court then held that the test was "clearly satisfied in this case because (1)
the generic advertising of California peaches and nectarines is unquestionably germane to the purposes of the marketing orders and, (2) in any event,

the assessments are not used to fund ideological speech.""
The Court concluded by saying that since the generic advertising pro-

visions of the marketing orders do not fit into any of the speech categories
discussed above, they are just a "species of economic regulation,"' 2 rather
than a regulation of speech. The Court said it was therefore error for the

court of appeals to rely on the intermediate scrutiny test in Central Hudson
when analyzing the issue."1Because the Court characterized the regulations
as economic in nature, the Court applied only a rational basis test to determine their validity." In finding the marketing orders constitutional, the
Court briefly noted that the purpose of generic advertising was both legitimate and consistent with the AMAA.Y
Justice Souter's Dissent
A significant portion of Justice Souter's dissent" focused on the majority's
reading of the Abood line of cases." Souter disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that Glicmnan was not even a First Amendment case." He felt
78. Id
79. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). The court also relied on Lehnert v. FerrisFaculty
Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991). Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2140. But see infra notes 93, 135-37 and accompanying text
80. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2140 (quoting Keller, 496 U.S. at 14).
81. Id.The Court went on to say that the program here is even less likely to violate the First
Amendment than the program that was upheld in Lehnert. Lehnert dealt with union agency-shop agreements which have been held to always impose some burden on free speech. On the other hand, collective
programs authorized by marketing orders have generally been held not to encroach upon First Amendment rights. Id. at2140 n. 16.
82. Id. at 2142.
83. Id. at2141.
84. Id. at2141-42.
85. Id. at2141.
86. Justice Souter filed a lengthy dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia and (except for part two) Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas (oined by Scalia, J.) also filed a
dissenting opinion. While agreeing with Souter's dissent that the marketing order did involve free
speech, Justice Thomas disagreed with the use of the Central Hudson balancing test. Thomas felt that
regulations of commercial speech should be scrutinized under the same heightened standard as other
speech. Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at 2155 (Thomas J., dissenting).
87. Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at 2142-48 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2145-46.
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that Abood did not say that the First Amendment is not implicated so long
as the speech is germane to lawful economic regulations." Souter conceded
that Abood allowed compulsory funding of certain union activities. 90He
said, however, that Abood first recognized that all compulsory funding impacted employees' First Amendment interests, and funding for certain activities was upheld only after the Court concluded that any First Amendment interference was justified." Souter noted that decisions after Abood
say that "a mandatory fee must not only be germane to some otherwise legitimate regulatory scheme; it must also be justified by vital policy interests
of the government and not add significantly to the burdening of free speech
inherent in achieving those interests. " "
In a separate but related point, Souter argued that the Court also erred
in interpreting the First Amendment test established in Abood.Y He contended that Abood does not stand for the proposition that, as long as the
speech is not political or ideological, the government does not violate the
First Amendment when it forces a member of an organization to fund
speech with which he disagrees."1 Souter argued that nothing in Abood or
the cases following it said that the government had the power to compel
funding for protected speech, whether political or nonpolitical.6 Souter understood Abood as holding that compelling individuals to make expenditures for speech is the same as prohibiting expenditures, therefore both are
protected by the First Amendment." The dissent stated that the same principle that applies to ideological speech should apply to commercial speech as
well." Thus, unlike the majority, Souter felt that the generic advertising
regulations clearly implicated the First Amendment, and in analyzing the
regulations, the Court should have applied the same scrutiny as if it were
looking at regulations prohibiting generic advertising.
After concluding that generic advertising programs were not merely
economic regulation, but rather the regulation of commercial speech, the
dissent applied the Central Hudson test. The dissent found that the market-

89. Id.
90. ld. at 2145.
91. Id.
92. The dissent cited Lehnert v. FerrisFaculty A.ls 'n, S00 U.S. S07 (1991). Glickman, I7 S. Ct. at
2146 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2146. This is a rephrasing of the test prescribed in Lehnert.
notes 95-101.
94. See infra
95. Glickman, 117 S.Ct at2147.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. In Souter's view, the only reason that the Court had not yet established this principle was
because this was a case of first impression since no case had yet involved the compelled finding of
commercial speech. Id.
99. Id. at 2149.
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ing orders concerning generic advertising failed all three prongs of the
test.' Thus, the dissent would have affirmed the court of appeals and in-

validated the marketing orders as they related to generic advertising.'
ANALYSIS
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. required the Court to analyze several strands of its First Amendment jurisprudence: compelled
speech, commercial speech, and compelled funding of other's speech.
Glickman itself, however, did not fit neatly into any single category. That
the case was difficult and novel does not excuse the Court's shortsighted
analysis. The majority in Glickman erred by examining the case as an economic regulatory scheme and determining that the generic advertisements
contained no speech element at all.112 Souter's dissent, while correctly recognizing the First Amendment implications of the dispute, erred by simply
concluding that, because advertisements were at issue, the CentralHudson
test for commercial speech should apply.'10 Rather, after recognizing that the
First Amendment was the appropriate standard, the Court should have
analogized Glickman to the compelled funding of speech cases exemplified
by Abood. Had they done so, the Court could have properly balanced the
interests of the growers (both the dissenters and the majority) and the government. As a result, the Court in Glickman has set dangerous precedent for
resolving future compelled funding of speech cases.
FirstAmendment Interests in Glickman
As discussed earlier, the Court in Glickman held that regulations requiring generic advertisements involved in the case did not implicate the
First Amendment.' The Court based this conclusion on three facts: the
marketing orders do not restrict the freedom of the producers to communicate their own messages; the orders do not compel the producers to engage
in actual or symbolic speech; and the orders do not compel the producers to
finance any political or ideological view."°'
The Court's conclusion that the First Amendment was inapplicable is
erroneous for several reasons. First, the Court's holding is a non sequitur.
The Court reasoned that the First Amendment did not apply to this case
because the facts and circumstances could be distinguished from earlier

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id at2149-54.
Id. at 2155.
Id. at 2138.
Id. at 2149.
See supranotes 60-85 and accompanying text.
Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2149.
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cases that violated the First Amendment.' In other words, just because the
Court was able to distinguish Glickman from other cases where the Court
found violations of the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that
First Amendment scrutinywas improper in Glickman."°"

More specifically, Justice Souter's dissent correctly pointed out the
Stating that
majority's "misemployment of Abood and its successors.'
"Abood merely recognized a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict
with one's 'freedom of belief,"'9 the Court held that when the government
neither forbids speech nor attributes it to an objector, only compelled speech

that is political or ideological will be scrutinized under the First Amendment.10 While Abood undoubtedly dealt with political speech, a close reading of the case illustrates that the Glickman Court read its holding much to
narrowly."' The Abood Court said that "[tjo compel employees financially

to support their collective-bargaining representative has an impact on their
First Amendment interests.""' Later, holding that public and private employees have the same First Amendment rights despite the fact that the ac-

tivities of the former could be called "political," the Court said "[n]othing in
the First Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjective 'political' can properly be attached to those be-

liefs the critical constitutional inquiry."", The same must surely be true
when the government compels growers to financially support the expressive
activities of the committees."' Thus, Souter was correct in concluding that

"Abood continues to stand for the proposition that being compelled to make
expenditures for protected speech 'works no less an infringement of...

constitutional rights' than being prohibited from making such expendi-

106. Clearly there is a difference between saying that the First Amendment does not apply and saying
that the First Amendment applies, but is not violated. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, "[i]t
is one thing to differ about whether a particular regulation involves an 'abridgment' of the freedom of
speech, but it is entirely another matter-and a complete repudiation of our precedent-for the majority
to deny that 'speech' is even at issue in this case." Id. at 2155-56 (Thomas, ., dissenting).
107. Indeed, not even the government argued that the regulations should be analyzed under any standard other than the First Amendment. Brief for Petitioner at iii, Glickman v. Wilcman Bros. & Elliott,
Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997) (No. 95-1184) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief] (on file with the Land and
Water Law Review).
108. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2147 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. ld. at 2139.
110. Seeid.at2142.
111. "While it is perfectly true that cases like Abood and Keller did involve political or ideological
speech, and the Court made reference to that character in explaining the gravity of the First Amendment
interests at stake, nothing in those cases suggests that government has free reign to compel funding of
nonpolitical speech...." Id. at 2147.
112. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,222 (1976).
113. Id. at 232. See generally Leading Cases, CommercialSpeech-Compelled Advertisng, I I1 HARV.
L. REv. 197, 325-29 (1997) (arguing that Gliclcman was a First Amendment case).
114. See supranotes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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tares."''s

Moreover, the majority's holding that the First Amendment does not
even apply to the generic advertising in Glickman seems to conflict with
some other basic principles of First Amendment law. First, as Souter
pointed out, the Court has traditionally held that all speech is subject to
some level of First Amendment protection unless it falls within an unprotected category of speech such as obscenity.'
Second, while the Court noted the importance of the "statutory context" and "regulatory scheme" in which Glickmnan arose,"' that fact seems
more relevant to the type of First Amendment scrutiny to apply, rather than
whether to apply First Amendment scrutiny at all."
Finally, the Court's reasoning creates an asymmetrical situation. It
seems hard to imagine that if Congress were to prohibit the generic advertising of California fruit that the Court would not view it as a First Amendment issue. The Court created another asymmetry as well: Buckley v.
Valeo" held that paying for political advertising was protected speech,
while Glickman held that paying for commercial advertising is not speech at
all.' Also, as to the audience, generic advertising would appear to be
speech whether or not it is compelled or in a "statutory context."' 2'
ConstitutionalScrutiny of the Generic Advertising Programin Glickman
Finding that the generic advertising involved in Glickman implicates
the First Amendment does not, however, end the inquiry. Souter, although
correct in finding a First Amendment interest in Glickman, was incorrect in
simply applying Central Hudson's test for commercial speech.'- He based
his decision to use Central Hudson on the First Amendment principle "that
compelling ... speech officially is just as suspect as suppressing it, and is

typically subject to the same level of scrutiny."" Although it is undoubtedly
true that in many instances the scrutiny applied to compelled speech should

115. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2147 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 234).
116. Id. at 2143. Indeed, the Court has gone even further recently and suggested that no category of
speech is "entirely invisible to the Constitution." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,383 (1992).
117. Glickman, 117 S. Ct at 2138.
118. See infranotes 131-32 and accompanying text.

119. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
120. See Leading Cases, Commercial Speech--Compelled Advertising, I1IHARV. L. REV. 197, 324

(1997).
121. Cf Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the FirstAmendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF

RTS. J. 1, 17 (1995) (discussing concern for audience and societal interests in the compelled speech
context).
122. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2149 (Souter, J., dissenting).

123. Id. at2144.
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be the same test that is applied to prohibitions on speech,12 Glickman is not
one of those instances.n
Despite any appeal of the CentralHudson test, the more appropriate
test is found in the line of First Amendment cases exemplified by Abood.
These cases mostly concern employees who were forced to contribute to
union activities that they found to be objectionable. The Court has extended
its analysis to other areas though, such as the integrated bar in Keller v.
26 The same analogy used to link Abood and Keller
State Bar of California.'
those
covered by the marketing orders on one hand,
can be made between
and unions and integrated bars on the other. In each case, individuals are
in organizations that conduct activities for the
compelled to participate
2
benefit of all members.'
The application of an Abood-type analysis to the facts of Glickman
makes sense because of the similarity of the competing interests involved.
In both cases, the government initially impacts the First Amendment rights
of individuals by requiring them to financially support a collective undertaking that they might not otherwise join or even support.'28 Additionally,
both cases represent instances where dissenting contributors object to the
use for which their money has been used by the majority. Thus, both are
instances where individuals are bringing specific First Amendment claims
in situations where the government has already impacted (without necessar-

124. See. e.g, supra notes 49-54,66 and accompanying text.
125. Other instances that would not fit the general rule are not hard to imagine. Suppose, for example,
that the handlers of California nectarines, peaches, and plums were forced to pay for advertising that
contained obscene images of nude men and women enjoying California tree fruit. Under Souter's reasoning it would appear that the handlers would have no recourse because the First Amendment does not
protect obscene speech. The scrutiny to be applied in compelled speech cases surely must not always
depend merely on the type of speech being compelled.
126. 496 U.S. 1 (1990). Keller involved members of the California Bar who objected to the Bar's
funding of certain ideological and political activities. In Keller, the Court found a "substantial analogy
between the relationship of the State Bar and its members, on the one hand, and the relationship of
employee unions and their members, on the other." Id. at 12. The Court based its analogy on the idea
that compelled memberships in these organizations prevented the "free-rider" problem-that it is unfair
for people to receive benefits for which they have not paid. Id.
127. The Petitioner's Brief also cited Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm 'n, 432 U.S.
333, 345 (1977), as "noting, in context of 'associational standing' under Article IIl, parallels between
state created commodity advertising commission, labor unions, and integrated bar associations." Petitioner's Brief at 24, Glickman, 117 S.Ct. 2130 (No. 95-1184). The Ninth Circuit's objection that there
was already a free-rider problem here because growers that are not covered by these specific marketing
orders (e.g., peach growers in Georgia) benefit from the generic advertisements seems to miss the mark.
See Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1995) ("If the Secretary is concerned
about free-riders, there are already plenty of them in other states."). Georgia peach growers can not be
said to free-riding on generic advertisements for California peaches because the ads promote California
fruit as unique. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2152 (Souter, I., dissenting). To argue otherwise is the equivalent of saying that Pepsi rides on the back of advertisements for Coke.
128. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 222 ("[te compel employees financially to support
their collective-bargaining representative has an impact on their First Amendment interests.").

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol33/iss2/13

14

Smith: Constitutional Law - Forced Advertising: Free Speech or Not Even
1998

CASE NOTES

ily infringing),9 their rights by requiring them to fund the collective activities in the first place. Thus, analysis under the Abood line of cases balances
the dissenters' individual First Amendment rights with the government's
interest in enabling the group to achieve its goals.3 '
The additional twist of the government requiring membership in the
first place removes Glickman and the Abood cases from the "typical" rule
on which Souter relies.' When scrutinizing the generic advertising program
in Glickman, the important fact to remember is that the government did not
merely coerce separate individuals to pay for speech; rather the government
had already lawfully required the handlers to act as a group, and then some
of the handlers objected to some of the group's speech. The Court itself has
noted the importance of the group setting in these types of cases:
The furtherance of the common cause [in this case, stable markets
and increased consumer demand] leaves some leeway for the leadership of the group. As long as they act to promote the cause which
justified bringing the group together, the individual cannot withdraw his financial support merely because he disagrees with the
32
group's strategy.1
Discerningthe Proper Testfrom the Abood Line
Even if the Court had correctly analyzed Glickman under the Abood
line, it would still have faced a difficult task. While Glickman can be analogized to the Abood line, trouble arises when the Court has tried to determine
just what these cases seem to mean. One author has stated that "[t]he Supreme Court has been unable to delineate, with any precision, the permissible boundaries within which unions may legally apply the dues collected
from objecting nonmembers without those expenditures being challenged

129. See, for example, Lehnert, where the court allowed the union to finance certain parts of the union
newsletter from the dues of dissenters. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 527 (1991).
130. These competing interests are summarized by the Court's language in Abood:
To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might well be
thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the
advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit. But the judgment clearly
made in Hanson and Street is that such interference as exits is constitutionally justified by the
legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor
relations established by Congress.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.

131. This conclusion is also different from the majority's reliance on the "regulatory scheme" in
which Glickman arises. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. The Court suggests that the context
goes to whether the generic advertising component of the marketing orders even implicates the First
Amendment, whereas analysis under the Abood line suggests that it goes to the weight of First Amendment interests involved.
132. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222-23 (quoting Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 778 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
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on First Amendment grounds."' The widely divergent explanations of
Abood itself in the majority and dissenting opinions of Glickman clearly
illustrate the confusion concerning Abood's meaning.'
At least one solution to the meaning of these cases is found in Lehnert
v. FerrisFaculty Ass 'n."I Decided in 1991, Lehnert is noteworthy because,
after a lengthy review of the precedent in the area, it "sets forth several
guidelines to be followed" when analyzing what kinds of activities dissenting union members can be forced to contribute financially."'3 The Court held
that "chargeable activities must (1) be 'germane' to collective-bargaining
activity; (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor
peace and avoiding 'free riders'; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening1 of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union
shop." "
Transferring the test to Glickman, the question would be whether the
generic advertisements (1) are germane to the marketing orders; (2) are justified by the governments vital policy interest in stable agricultural markets
and avoiding "free riders"; and (3) do not significantly add to the burdening
of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of the marketing order. This
test is appropriate because, as stated earlier, it balances the interests of both
the government and the dissenters in the context of "the cause which justified bringing the group together.""'
While a full scale application of this test to the facts of Glickman is beyond the scope of this note, it would seem that the generic advertising portion of the marketing orders in question would have a good chance of surviving scrutiny. The generic advertising of the California peaches, plums
and nectarines seems germane to the purpose of maintaining fair prices by

133. Joseph A. Ciucci, Note, Defining the Permissible Uses of Objecting Members' Agency Dues: Is
the Solution Any Clearer After Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n?, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 89, 10
(1992) (noting that "the Court has perpetuated uncertainty and confusion, and will in the future certainly
be required to reassess these problems and issue an opinion that provides a practical, analytical standard").
134. See supra notes 74-81, 87-98 and accompanying text.
135. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
136. Id. at 519.
137. Id. Although the Glickman majority did not mention the Lehnert test, Justice Souter discussed it
in his dissent. Souter said that a mandatory fee must be "justifiedby vitalpolicy interests of the government." Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2146 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). This change would seem
to make a great difference in the amount of scrutiny a chargeable activity would receive. Under Souter's
test, the activity itself would have to constitute a vital policy interest. A plain reading of the wording in
Lehnert suggests that the vital policy interest is what warranted the government to form the group in the
first place, and the chargeable activity must merely be justified in light of those interests. Indeed, it
would be hard to describe as a "vital policy interest" the conventions upheld in Lehnert. Lehnert, 500
U.S. at 530.
138. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
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keeping demand up among consumers. Reducing the free rider problem
justifies the requirement that all handlers pay for generic advertising. Finally, given that the marketing orders create a highly regulated arena to begin with, forced payments for generic advertising add little to the First
Amendment burden that handlers already bear."1
CONCLUSION

After the decision in Glickman, one commentator remarked that the
decision was not "a vital development in First Amendment jurisprudence."1
If this is in fact the case, it is only because the Court decided the case on its
most simplistic level. Not answering the more difficult questions was relatively easy in this case because it appeared the dissenting growers and handlers were trying to use the First Amendment to advance their own pecuniary interests. The luxury of a non-deserving challenger will not always be
the case, though. Can any rule, by the fact that it is related to an economic
regulation, be exempt from First Amendment scrutiny? Surely not, but
Glickman seems to set the stage for just this argument. Justice Jackson
warned of the perils of shirking the tough questions. "The principle then lies
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
bring forward a plausible claim ... ""I Glickman is a loaded weapon.
DAVE SMITH

139. Of course, Souter would probably strike down the regulations given his reading of the Lehmert
test and his analysis under Central Hudson. See supra notes 93, 100 and accompanying text.
140. Felix H. Kent, Compelled Contributionsto CommercialSpeech, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 15, 1997, at 3.
141. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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